Thank You

I would like to thank all those Members of Parliament, along with many friends and acquaintances, who helped me by contributing thoughts and suggestions to my new book 'Putting An Old Head on Young Shoulders'. Get your FREE copy.

If you would like to read a copy of it, there is a pdf version available to be downloaded from click here. It's on top of the list of files.

Probably my favourite MP contribution was,

"No-one is ever 100% right and no-one is 100% wrong, so the truth must lie between the extremes."

Just one of the many contributions that I valued.

Best wishes, hope you enjoy the read.

Steve Baron

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I have a question...

In your opinion, what would be the worst decisions past governments have made in New Zealand? For example, was sending troops to Vietnam a major blunder by our elected representatives? I would like to use some of these in my next book I am currently researching.
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Referendum system inadequate

Press release by Steve Baron - Better Democracy NZ

16/6/09

Press release:

by Steve Baron - Better Democracy NZ

Referendum system inadequate

“Politicians can be justified in their concerns about the referendum process, particularly in respect to the wording.” says Steve Baron, the Founder of Better Democracy NZ and co-editor of the book People Power.

“Many referendums in the past have been ambiguous, misleading, biased and confusing.” says Mr Baron, whose organisation has in the past recommended a professional Referendum Panel comprising of three retired High Court judges to approve the wording of any referendum question.

Mr Baron says, “There should be consultation with the referendum Initiator, but the Referendum Panel should have the final say if all parties cannot agree. The Referendum Panel should also approve the wording of a Referendum Pamphlet and Referendum website which should state the arguments for and against the referendum in a constructive and informative manner.”

“If politicians are going to take referendums seriously, and consider such an option, they should also be considering the right of citizens to have their will enforced, and make all referendums binding. If they are not binding they are not worth the paper they are written on.” says Mr Baron.

Better Democracy NZ has also been promoting that signature numbers required to trigger a referendum be reduced to 100,000 instead of the current 10 percent which is approximately 300,000. They would also like all conscience votes in parliament abolished, with a mandatory referendum instead, as well as a referendum on any constitutional type changes. “The conscience of the general public is just as important as the conscience of MPs.” says Mr Baron.

END

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Get cracking on referendum act

DomPost article. The unfolding shambles around the "anti-smacking referendum" invites a full review of the Citizens Initiated Referenda Act.

Even before the voting slips arrive in our letter boxes, we know that, no matter how strong the vote, the politicians are not going to change their minds.

And - arguably - neither should they. The question is poorly framed and manages to be both leading and ambiguous at the same time. This makes the $9 million cost of the exercise troubling - especially when Child, Youth and Family Service centres are being closed and police are cutting the size of their fleet because of budget pressures.

But the problem goes beyond the particular circumstances of this case. This is the fourth referendum to be held under the act. The pattern of the previous three - relating to professional firefighter numbers, whether we should have 99 or 120 MPs, and law and order - is that they typically attract high majorities among those who vote, ranging from 81.46 per cent to 91.75 per cent. Yet none of them has had much real effect upon the political process. The result is increasing cynicism, which is corrosive of rather than encouraging of democratic participation.

Caroline Morris, a lecturer in public law at Victoria University, in an excellent article for the Statute Law Review, notes that the act seems to have fallen into desuetude. It began with a hiss and a roar in 1994 with 18 questions submitted but enthusiasm has waned significantly since then.

David Lange, in the parliamentary debate on the bill, put his finger on a key issue when he said: "[It] is actually a fraud on the community for the government to ask it for its opinion when the government has said that it will not necessarily follow that opinion".

But it would be a very big step to make citizen-initiated referendums binding as they are necessarily blunt instruments and do not permit nuanced or detailed policy-making. Equally, it would be a big step to repeal the act entirely, as it has the potential to be an important expression of our democracy and an opportunity for the public to attempt to influence the political agenda.

There are, however, some smaller changes we could make to restore public confidence in the system, to improve product quality and to better justify the associated financial costs.

First, we need to revisit the sanctity of the question proposed by petitioners. The Clerk of the House, who is responsible for ensuring the question is clear and is capable of a simple "yes" or "no" answer, can consult the legislative advisory committee and the Justice Ministry in the performance of this function.

Ad Feedback BUT the clerk can offer technical advice only and clarify the language used. There is no real mandate to offer, let alone insist on, alternative drafts.

The result has too often been poorly designed questions. We need greater legislative prescription around what constitutes an acceptable question. Principles could be written into the act to ensure questions will produce results that can unambiguously inform law reform, are not compound in construction and do not lead a response. The quid pro quo for this greater discipline will be greater credibility.

Second, we need to revisit the clerk's role. It was not a role the office sought and is outside the office's expertise. Why not have a panel of experts to which the clerk can refer questions? Or a retired judge?

Third, we need to require a formal response from the government. At the least, this would be a considered explanation of why the referendum proposition will not be acted on.

New Zealand is the first and only country to have legislated for non-binding citizen-initiated referendums. The legislation is experimental and was acknowledged to be so when passed, with Doug Graham, justice minister at the time, indicating it would be reviewed within five years.

Sixteen years later - and with a National government again in the Beehive - it may be time to conduct that review.

* Andy Nicholls is a partner at Chapman Tripp, specialising in public law and competition issues. The views presented here are his own.

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Local government, a test bed for Direct Democracy.

Local government spending has been in the headlines lately, but this is nothing new. I remember back in 2003 being one of the many

Aucklanders who were part of the ARC rates revolt against huge rate hikes.

There has also been much debate and anger over Dunedin's proposed new Carisbrook stadium, which the City Council is expected to pay $85m towards. One ratepayer was so incensed he even nailed a rates revolt declaration to the front door of the City Council building and over 1300 people marched down the main street. There could be calls for a rates boycott if the stadium goes ahead.

Most recently Local Government Minister Rodney Hide has highlighted the ARC's loss of $1.79m on the Beckham football match and has called for a more conservative approach to spending.

The opposite side of the coin is the Wanganui City Council, where Mayor Michael Laws has taken a totally different approach. In May 2005 the Council initiated their first referendum. Each person listed on the Wanganui electoral roll was given the opportunity to prioritise three projects out of fourteen capital funding proposals, via the post. A staggering 54% of voters returned forms. The average turnout throughout New Zealand for local body elections was only 41%. Then in 2008 they gave ratepayers the option to choose three different rating scenarios for 2009 and 2010. The rates increase brackets included 2-3%, 4-5%, and 7-8%, with Laws saying, “In each option, we will make it clear what projects or council services are included, and which are excluded or council services reduced."

Now contrast that to the dictatorial style of most City Councils when it comes to spending ratepayer’s hard earned money with ever increasing rates. One has to ask the question if it is time to use local government as a test bed for direct democracy, as an adjunct to representative democracy, so that ratepayers have more say in where and how their money is spent.

Professor John Matsusaka (Direct Democracy Works, 2005), from the University of Southern California says, “Not only is direct democracy firmly established in the United States, but it is spreading across the world. The spread of direct democracy is fueled in part by the revolution in communications technology, which has given ordinary citizens unprecedented access to information and heightened the desire to participate directly in policy decisions.”

Although some may argue that the referendum process has paralysed the California budget, Professor Matsusaka (2003) has disproved this. Many also point to California's Proposition thirteen in 1978, saying the people are not equipped to make responsible decisions on matters of taxation and government spending. However they fail to tell both sides of the story, by conveniently forgetting that property taxes had risen steadily for a period of five years, even though the Californian government had amassed a surplus of over five billion dollars at the time. California's Proposition nine would also have halved State income taxes, but was defeated by a majority of two to one.

Studies have also shown that the effect of mandatory referendums on spending decisions in Swiss cantons has reduced government spending by nineteen percent.(Lars & Matsusaka, 2003). When spending is reduced then rates can be reduced. The trouble is that without any checks and balances, City Councils have a propensity to overspend. The Beckham football match costing $1.79m a classic example. This is where a special case of moral hazard called the principle-agent problem comes in to the equation. This is where the City Council (agent) acts on behalf of ratepayers (principal), however the City Council usually has more information about their actions or intentions than the ratepayers do. This is because the ratepayers usually cannot perfectly monitor the City Council. The City Council may have an incentive to act inappropriately (from the viewpoint of the ratepayers) if both interests are not aligned. The trouble is that City Councils can not be perfectly monitored by ratepayers and even when they do not agree with the City Council, there is next to nothing they can do. With the threat of a binding referendum hanging over the Councils heads, elected representatives quickly become more in tune with what those who elected them want.

Another aspect of direct democracy is the Recall. In October 2003 California, the 5th largest economy in the world, collected enough signatures to trigger a State wide binding referendum to recall Governor Gray Davis. The referendum was successful and he was replaced with Arnold Schwarzenegger.

If ratepayers aren’t happy with the job their politicians are doing then they should be able to do something about it expediently. There needs to be checks and balances. Binding Referendums and the Recall can give ratepayers that option.

We are at a point in New Zealand politics where voters no longer trust their politicians to make every decision for them. Certainly they look to politicians for leadership and most often voters are happy to let them get on with their job, but that does not mean they agree with everything politicians want to do. If the Minister for Local Government really wants to make a difference then his first duty must be to enact these options.



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Chief Justice speaks out

My thoughts on the Chief Justice Dame Sian Elias recent comments.

Whether or not we agree with Chief Justice, Dame Sian Elias, we should all commend her courage for being prepared to speak out and challenge the government. If her comments offend those in government who believe she has over stepped her position, it is only because those in government have oversized egos. It is the right and obligation of each and every New Zealander, regardless of their position or role in society, to speak out when they believe something needs to be said. Democracy should be a true exchange of communication between the elected and the electorate, with the electorate being sovereign at all times, and being able to override decisions of the elected when they think it is important to do so. Democracy certainly isn't electing a few so called elite, who think they know more than everyone else. The collective wisdom of three million voters is far more cogent than the collective wisdom of a small number of elected representatives bound by party ideology and bias.

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Radio Live interview

To listen to my Radio Live interview with Maggie Barry click here link text and then select Jun 17, 2009 16.45. It's about 7 minutes into this section and you can fast forward.
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Noam Chomsky says NZ not a democracy

Well, he said America wasn't a democracy actually, but when you watch this video he could certainly be talking about New Zealand! This

guy makes a lot of sense so I would recommend you watch the video.


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Donations

Thank you to those of you who continue to make donations. Much appreciated. The bank account is building up a little bit but we could certainly do with much more so we can make choices around election time. Even a small regular or one off donation is very much appreciated and will go a long way. You can pay directly to our Westpac bank account, Better Democracy NZ 03 1568 0261451 000 or use PAYPAL below. link text
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Sir Roger Douglas on Supercity

Here is Sir Roger Douglas's submission to the Select Committee on Auckland. Part of his submission is also the inclusion of referendums.

Contents

I Executive Summary

II The Problems with Local Government

III A Structure for Local Government

A The Greater Auckland Council and Community Councils

B Choice and Flexibility

C Competing with the Market

IV Key Points on Structure

V The Functions of Local Government

A What Governments Should Do

i Spending Referenda

ii Privatisation and Corporatisation

VI Conclusion

Appendix One: The Functions of Community Councils

Appendix Two: The Functions of the Greater Regional Council

"In all that people can do for themselves, the government ought not to interfere."

- Abraham Lincoln

I Executive Summary

This paper has two purposes. The first purpose is to propose mechanisms that will enable greater community representation in Local Government. These mechanisms include greater residential choice over Council size and representation, as well as stricter democratic checks on Council expenditure.

The second purpose is to emphasise that the functions delegated to Councils determine the scope of Council activity, and therefore the value of the rates paid by ratepayers.

There are two ways to reduce the waste in Local Government. One way is to adjust the structure of Local Government, making it more innovative and competitive.

In the long term, this protects residents from Councils which engage in low-value spending by giving residents more choices. The other way is to limit the functions of Local Government to reduce its expansion into those areas which are inappropriate or particularly wasteful.

Both ways are important if the level of waste in Local Government is to be addressed.

The Royal Commission on Auckland Governance, however, focussed only on structure. That is why the mayors and councillors have spent the whole duration of the Royal Commission process seeking to protect their own territory, while continuing to spend more money and increase rates.

Any determination of the appropriate structure for Local Government must flow from the functions which central Government delegates to it – only if we know what powers Local Government is exercising will it make sense to talk about how we wish to structure the body that exercises those powers.

Given that the Royal Commission was expressly prohibited from considering “the purposes and principles of Local Government as described in the Local Government Act 2002”, it was entirely predictable that it would come up with the confused structure it did.

In terms of structure, there should be two distinct levels of Local Government. The first level is the Greater Regional Council, which will oversee the broad issues like arterial roading and stormwater. The number of staff employed in this role need not be significant.

The second level is the Community Council, which has the role of representing the local community and carrying out those activities that primarily affect the community. It should be noted that, while this paper focuses on Auckland – and more specifically the role of Community Councils in Auckland – the basic model is able to be applied to other regions as well.

On the community level, Councils should be designed to allow greater choice and competition between Community Councils, as well as providing for greater community control over expenditure.

Mechanisms that allow individuals to opt out of certain Council functions, and groups of individuals to switch Community Council, create a new Community Council, or amalgamate with an adjacent Community Council will foster greater competition between Councils. Such competition will allow more diversity and experimentation within Local Government.

Successful Community Council models will be able to be copied, and become the industry standard. For example, some Councils may decide to completely contract out the services that they provide, while others may directly employ staff to carry out the delegated functions. Regardless of the decisions that are made, the results will be obvious to all as to which model is more effective at delivering services and constraining costs.

The most successful model will then be able to be emulated, with the benefits going to the ratepayers in the form of superior service and lower rates.

In terms of functions, the powers of Local Government – on both the community and regional level – must be constrained by central Government. That means removing the power of general competence.

Any delegation of authority to Local Government should allow it to provide genuine public goods, while constraining activity in areas in which the market performs better. Given that Local Government will have the authority to spend money on the provision of public goods, then it must also have the capacity to set its own rates.

This paper sets out: first, the problems with Local Government, second, a proposed structure for Local Governance that would allow Councils to adapt over time, while subjecting them to competitive pressures; and third, what the role of Local Government under this revised structure should be.

II The Problems with Local Government

Structurally, Local Government is currently a monopoly. Although people can switch Local Governance supplier by moving suburb, the transaction costs are far too high to make Councils genuinely competitive. The effect of high transaction costs are to limit choice and competition, thereby inhibiting the benefits that competition delivers in terms of reducing costs and improving service quality. With poor competition in Local Government, rates have increased substantially in recent years. They have not delivered value for money.

In addition to the structural flaws, Councils have been delegated an ever larger role in our lives since 2002. This has seen the size of Councils’ budgets soar, along with the rates that ratepayers are required to pay. Often, this spending has been advanced because it is in the special interest, rather than the general interest. With low voter turnout, special interests have been particularly effective at hijacking the ratepayers’ wallets and purses for their own gain.

There is no other explanation for the kind of expenditure that we have seen on subsidies for sports and cultural events, funded from already-squeezed ratepayers.

If we are to genuinely end Council waste, and ensure that Councils deliver value for money, then both the structural and functional issues need to be addressed.

III A Structure for Local Government

The principle that should underlie the structure of Local Government is that those most affected by Council decisions must have the capacity to voice their opinion. This principle is commonly known as subsidiarity – the idea that matters ought to be dealt with by the least centralised but competent authority possible.

For decisions over things like what food to eat or what job to seek, the most appropriate authority is the individual. For decisions over things like the local library or swimming pool in a community, the most appropriate authority is the community. However, as the effect of policies broaden – such as policies relating to regional parks or large roading proposals – it makes sense for such decisions to be made at the regional and, where appropriate, national level.

A The Greater Auckland Council and Community Councils

While the focus of this paper is primarily on the role of the second-tier level of Governance (i.e., the level below the Greater Regional Council), it is useful to provide some explanation of the role and size of the Greater Auckland Council itself. The Greater London Authority – which has wider functions than the Auckland Council, covering police and health services as well – has only 600 staff. With those staff, the Authority is able to plan and implement the policies that are part of the proper role of Government.

If Auckland were able to operate similarly, then we would be able to reduce rates heavily, while empowering the community-level government to undertake those decisions which have more direct impacts on their community.

It is important that those making decisions for the spending of money also raise the revenue required to pay for it. If decisions can be made by a community and then funded from the Greater Regional Council’s budget, then it is clearly in the interests of the community to spend as much money as they can.

Furthermore, even if the flow of funds is limited in some way from the regional to the community level (i.e., bulk funding, as has been proposed), then Community Councils will still be strong spending advocates. As each Community Council seeks to consume more of regional revenue than they are required to pay, there will be the potential for a general inflation in the level of rates.

Only when Government bodies are held responsible for setting and collecting rates and expenditure will there be adequate checks on their capacity to spend. The rates set by Community Councils could be collected on their behalf by the Greater Regional Council, but it is most important that the resident knows which portion of rates goes to the Community Council and which portion goes to the Greater Regional Council.

While the Government’s position on Community Councils – a position which departs from the Royal Commission’s absurd proposal to have only six local Councils beneath the regional authority – is generally sound, it is also important that Community Councils are held accountable for what they spend. This will only occur if they raise their own revenue.

B Choice and Flexibility

When it comes to determining the size of Community Councils, it is necessary that the structure is flexible. This will avoid the need to reconsider the issues centrally further down the track. This means that the structure must be malleable in response to the changing wishes of the communities. In this sense the Government is moving in the right direction by allowing more local Councils, but further gains could be made in this area.

The need for adaptability suggests two things about the structure of Community Councils.

First, it is important to allow ratepayers to have a say up front over how many Community Councils there are. The suggested boundaries should be drawn up by the Local Government Commission and a submission process implemented that allows ratepayers to adjust the boundaries and seek to have new Councils created.

Small communities could seek to have their own Community Council if that was their wish. Second, ratepayers should have the capacity to change Council boundaries over time.

There should be several ways to alter the boundaries of Councils. The first way is to allow areas of some defined minimum population size (say, for example, 10 000 people) to seek a referendum creating a new Community Council for their district. This number would obviously need to be smaller for rural communities that may wish to create a new Council (perhaps 2 000 people, or a geographically defined area). This would allow small communities of interest to structure their Community Council in a way that reflects their distinct interests.

With the referendum capacity outlined below in part IV, which allows for an expansion of Community Council functions, this would enable a diversity of Local Government models.

In addition to this flexibility, a group of citizens adjacent to another Community Council should be able to opt-out of their current Council, joining the neighbouring Council, if they think their mode of service delivery is more suitable to their wishes. The capacity to change Council will create competition for ratepayers, which is likely to see value for money being delivered by Local Government. Although this choice would only be able to be used by those at the edges, the capacity for others to change providers drives efficiency and therefore benefits all ratepayers.

Moreover, Councils should be able to amalgamate. Where communities of interest change over time, or should one set of ratepayers think that another Council’s services are better, then they should be able to join together with them to serve a larger set of ratepayers. Equally, it may sometimes make sense for Councils to split in two, but this process would be driven by and determined by ratepayers.

This ensures that residents have not only the option of voice in local Governance, but also the capacity to exit Governance arrangements that do not suit them. The capacity for successful Councils to draw in additional ratepayers around their boundaries, or alternatively for successful Councils to expand by amalgamating with Councils from other areas, ensures that there is some level of competition between Community Councils. This competitive element protects all ratepayers, because the capacity for others to make choices at the margin ensures we all receive better services for less cost. In addition, competition will allow for much greater choice amongst ratepayers.

This will allow the diversity of our communities to be reflected through a diversity of Community Councils.

This kind of flexibility is even more important in the longer term. Given the unpredictable way in which Auckland will grow and develop, this mechanism allows the structure to evolve with the changing needs of the people. This will ensure that costly reviews and restructuring are not necessary in the future, and also that change comes from the residents, rather than from central Government.

C Competing with the Market

Some of the standard roles of Councils, such as rubbish collection, are increasingly being duplicated by private market competitors. Many ratepayers are essentially willing to pay twice for rubbish collection – once through Councils, and once through private companies like Dimac Bins. Given the difficulty of competing against free or heavily subsidised services, this suggests that the private market is delivering far superior service.

This duplication is unnecessary, and could be reduced if we allowed ratepayers to opt out of certain Council functions.

Any rates bill received by a ratepayer should set out where their rates were spent. Once received, ratepayers should be able to opt out of certain functions undertaken by the Council in exchange for lower rates. Examples of activity where this sort of system could be successfully implemented are rubbish collection and recycling.

By allowing greater consumer choice, we provide a further incentive to mitigate waste in the delivery of Local Government services. Although this option would not be available in those areas where there are cross-subsidies occurring (e.g. it would be inappropriate to be able to opt out of paying for parks, pools, libraries, etc.), it would act as a way to reduce costs and increase the level of diversity in certain services.

IV Key Points on Structure

There are several key points that are required to create more democratic, competitive, and efficient Local Government in Auckland:

• The number of Community Councils should be decided by the people.

• Community Councils should be small enough to represent genuine communities, not mere bureaucratic structures like those advocated by the Royal Commission.

• Communities should elect their own Community Councils, and these Councils must have real powers (e.g. the capacity to set rates).


• Each Community Council should be made up of a mayor/chairperson and no more than five councillors.


• They should not be allowed to have more than 24 paid meetings a year.


• Ratepayers should be given greater choice in terms of which Council serves them (i.e., they can pick adjacent Councils), and successful Councils should be allowed to merge with others Councils. New Councils should also be able to be created.


• Any budget of a Community Council should be endorsed by the community at a community annual general meeting. That is, the rates should be discussed and voted on. If rejected, Community Councils should have to adapt them and hold a second meeting.


• Any proposal that increases spending by more than 2.5% on any single activity would need to be passed in a referendum (see below).


• For the Greater Regional Council, there should be a mayor and eight councillors also elected at large. Given the local representation that will exist at the Community Council level, what is needed at the Regional level is more like a high-powered Board of Directors with a diversity of skills and experience. This is more likely to occur when the councillors are elected at large, and a board of eight is likely to attract top quality candidates.


• The functions of both Community Councils and the Greater Regional Council would be prescribed by legislation (see Appendix One and Two).



V The Functions of Local Government



The functions that Councils are delegated – on both the Regional and Community level – should be limited. Should the Council wish to expand their functions outside those specifically enumerated, they should be required to get the agreement of the ratepayers. This is equally true when it comes to large spending increases undertaken by Councils. A limitation on the functions and spending, subject to ratepayer control, enables ratepayers to exercise greater democratic control over their elected representatives.



A What Governments Should Do



The role of Government should be limited to the production of those goods or services which people want but that, without Government interference, individuals could not produce for themselves through voluntary means. The bulk of goods and services in New Zealand are able to be privately provided through the market. To the extent that this is true, the market should continue to fulfil this role. However, in certain situations, markets fail.



For example, markets create poor incentives when it comes to the private provision of public goods. It is important to be precise about what is meant by a “public good.” A public good is not just a good that is provided to the public at large. A public good is a good that is both non-rivalrous and non-excludable. In other words, a public good exists when consumption of a good by one person does not reduce the consumption of the good by another person, and when once the good is provided it is necessarily provided to all.



An example of a public good is defence – when the navy defends our waters, it necessarily defends all those living in New Zealand.



Examples of traditional public goods other than defence are the courts and the police. In addition to these traditional functions, there is also a case to be made for the provision of health and education to the public. Even those goods need not be directly provided by Government. Lower taxes would enable many to purchase private health insurance or fund education at a private school. Alternatively, School Voucher schemes and Health Savings Accounts would create a mixed system of private provision and public funding, enabling consumers to choose the services they want while also ensuring that every one can meet their education and health needs.



In addition to the provision of public goods, many Governments also undertake programs on the basis of equity. Transfer programs, for example, are often not justifiable on the grounds that they fulfil a public good, but are instead justified on equity grounds. To the extent that the public wishes to adopt a program on the grounds of equity, it is more appropriate that this occur through central rather than Local Government. There are two main reasons for this.



First, the distribution of wealth within a Council’s area is not known to the Council – rates are set on the basis of the value of the land. Land value is a blunt instrument to determine the actual relative wealth of ratepayers. This suggests that redistribution at the local level is unlikely to reflect genuine wealth, and therefore could be counterproductive.



Second, the fact that central Government also deals with equity issues may lead to policy duplication – or worse, policy inconsistency – which will exacerbate Government waste. Local Government has little role in pursuing policies on equity grounds.



Local Government is only legally allowed to undertake those functions specifically delegated to it by central Government legislation. Any exercise of power beyond that specifically enumerated is considered to be ultra vires. The relationship between central and Local Government was changed considerably when the power of general competence was granted to Councils in 2002.



The granting of this power has led to an expansion of Local Government activity away from their core roles and into areas for which Local Government is ill-suited. Local Government should be confined as far as possible to the delivery of genuine public goods. Councils should be able to undertake activities beyond the provision of public goods, but only after such activities are approved through a referendum process (in the case of a Community Council), or after central Government has approved such activities (in the case of a Greater Regional Council).



i Spending Referenda



There would be two situations in which a Community Council decision would be put to a public referendum. First, any decision to increase spending (and therefore rates) on any single activity by more than 2.5% would need to be approved by the ratepayers. Where rates were to increase beyond the rate of inflation, they would need to be certified by the residents at the Annual General Meeting. Second, any expansion of the Community Council’s role beyond those functions set out in Appendix One, would need to be approved by the community.



The first step in the referendum process would be for the Community Council to come up with a spending proposal (for example, they may propose to build an entertainment venue in their community). Their proposal would need to set out the estimated costs, as well as the outcomes that they were hoping to achieve. Second, this proposal would be independently audited by a third party – perhaps by the Office of the Auditor General.



This audit would include a cost-benefit analysis. Third, a referendum would be held which would put the Council’s proposal, with the independent cost-benefit analysis, before the electorate. The referendum would make clear to all the residents the costs and potential benefits of the policy, ensuring they had sufficient information to adequately decide whether such a proposal was worthwhile.



The other way to achieve greater ratepayer control of Community Council spending is to require Community Councils to present their planned budget to an Annual General Meeting, and require the budget to be passed by the residents. Should the residents not pass the budget, then the Community Council should be required to come back to the residents with an alternative proposal. In this way, Community Council spending will be subject to greater democratic checks, helping to reign in spendthrift Councils.



ii Privatisation and Corporatisation



Those functions which are not public goods – such as the operation of ports – should be privatised, or structured by the Council as a business (much like State-Owned-Enterprises). The ports face a particular problem, with port rationalisation being in the economic interests of the nation. Unfortunately, most Councils hold onto these assets hoping they can use them as cash cows. The only option with ports is a divestment to the ratepayers, which will create a more realistic and competitive environment for the traded goods sector of our economy.



The profit motive is particularly effective at reducing waste, because it provides a benefit to shareholders in the form of profit if waste is cut.



However, the effect of competition between alternative suppliers ensures that the benefits of cutting waste are ultimately derived by the consumer, who pays lower prices than they otherwise would if the waste persisted. This is why the privatisation or corporatisation of Government-owned assets has historically led to lower prices, more production, greater levels of efficiency, a greater variety of goods and services, and higher quality standards.



In areas where there will be a lack of competition – such as the provision of water – it is important for Councils to operate a user-pays system, while regulating market power. Even if held in public hands, regulation of market power is necessary to avoid these assets being used as cash cows by Local Government. In many parts of Auckland water is metered. This model should be expanded to other areas as well. Unless water is metered, water is paid for through rates. The marginal cost of water to the individual is essentially zero, providing incentives for overuse. Put simply, those without pools subsidise those with pools.



The lack of marginal pricing ensures that people over-consume water, and the effect of every one over-consuming is that our overall rates are high. If water was metered and charged on the basis of actual use, then people would make more of an effort to conserve water and reduce their use of it. The use of pricing is consistent with environmental aims of reducing water overuse.



The process of privatisation need not see assets transferred into the hands of large corporations should the public not wish that to happen. There are two alternative ways to privatise assets. The first way is through a share distribution to the ratepayers in the region, restoring genuine public ownership over these important assets.



The second way, which is likely to be less effective, is through the creation of companies that distributed profits back to those who used their services.



VI Conclusion



Unless the functions of Local Government are explicitly set out, then we will continue to see the unnecessary and wasteful growth in Local Government of the last few years, and the increase in rates that such growth necessitates. The proper role of Local Government is the delivery of public goods. Should ratepayers wish to expand the role of their Council beyond that, then they should do so through a referendum process.



In terms of the structure, the golden rule is that decisions must be made by those closest to the action. Capability to make the decisions also necessitates responsibility for raising the revenue to pay for it.



Unless they are required to raise the revenue, Community Councils will join the queue of special interests which advocate increased spending. By devolving power to the community level where appropriate, we will empower local communities and allow greater diversity and competition in Local Government.

Appendix One: The Functions of Community Councils



Community

Policy-making Functions
Community

Service Delivery Functions
Community

Engagement Functions

Input into regional policy making
Dog control policy
Gambling policy
Liquor licensing
Brothels – control of location and signage
District promotion
Planning applications
Local road construction and maintenance
Street lighting
Footpaths, cycleways, walkways
Graffiti removal
Resource consents
Building consents
Environmental health control (food premises licensing)
Animal control
Local parks
Recreation centres
Community centres
Cultural venues
Litter control
Public toilets
Camping grounds
Crime prevention
Artworks
Citizens Advice Bureaux
Local art galleries and museums
Identifying the needs of the community
Supporting local groups through grants
Considering what form of service delivery is appropriate (e.g., complete contracting out to private sector, or direct employment to fulfil responsibilities).

Appendix Two: The Functions of the Greater Regional Council



Regional

Policy-Making Functions
Regional

Service Delivery Functions
Regional

Administrative Services

Transport planning
Economic Development
Infrastructure
Branding
Environmental Planning
Policy Statement
Coastal, air, water controls
Hazard management
Recreational planning
Regional parks
Other regulatory matters
Civil defense
Promoting sport and recreation
Biosecurity
Harbourmaster
Arterial road construction and maintenance
Water, wastewater, stormwater drainage
Solid waste management
Zoo
Regional parks
Regional facilities for sports and culture
City centre and waterfront
Regional library
Cemeteries and crematoria
Prepare annual financial plans
Make and administer rates for Regional Authority
Provide shared services as agreed between Regional Authority and Community Councils
Asset and liability management
Public information services
Inform Community Councils on matters affecting regional functions

ENDS

Media Contact: Heidi Bale, 09 523 0474 / 021 242 7189.

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Cartoon

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Two Swiss referendums on drugs

Further to the discussion on the attempt to legalise the use of marijuana for medicinal purposes, I post this summary of two referendums held eleven years apart in Switzerland. Your comments, please!


Referendum No 538 30 November 2008:
“For a rational policy on cannabis to protect young people effectively.”

The Swiss Federal Constitution would be supplemented as follows:

Article 105a (new) Cannabis
1. The acquisition and possession of cannabis for personal use, and the consumption of the psychoactive substances of cannabis is not a criminal offence.
2. The cultivation of psychoactive cannabis for personal use is not a criminal offence.
3. The Confederation enacts regulations concerning the cultivation, production, import, export and trade in the psychoactive substances of cannabis.
4. The Confederation takes appropriate measures to ensure the protection of young people. Publicity for the psychoactive substances of cannabis or for the use of such substances is prohibited.

Summary of results of the initiative:
Total number of voters: 4,996,626
Turnout 47.34%
Yes: 36.7% No: 63.3% The initiative was rejected.


Referendum No 438 28 September 1997
“For Youth without drugs.”

The Swiss Federal Constitution would be supplemented as follows:

Article 68bis (new)
1. In the fight against drug-addiction, the Confederation follows a strict policy, aiming directly at abstinence.
2. The Confederation takes, by legislative means, all measures needed to restrict the demand for narcotics and the number of consumers, to look after the addicted, to reduce the social and economic damage due to the consumption of narcotics and to fight any illicit traffic in them.
3. To protect young people from drug-addiction, the Confederation opposes all consumption of narcotics and follows an active prevention policy to strengthen the personality of the individual.
4. The Confederation encourages and supports the application of measures necessary to ensure physical weaning, the lasting detoxication and the social rehabilitation of drug addicts.
5. The distribution of narcotics is prohibited. Exceptions are made for strictly medical applications, but excluding the use of: heroin, of opium to smoke, of cocaine, of cannabis, of' hallucinogens and of similar substances.

Summary of results of the initiative:
Total number of voters: 4,618,943
Turnout 40.83%
Yes: 29.3% No: 70.7% The initiative was rejected.


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Our submission rejected

The submission we sent to the Local Government (Auckland Council) Bill committee has been returned saying it does not address the matters raised in the bill. Here is my response to the Clerk of the committee.

Paul Weakley
Clerk of Committee
Commerce Committee
Office of the Clerk of the House of Representatives
paul.weakley@parliament.govt.nz

RE: Your letter dated 1 July 2009

As per our telephone discussion on Monday 6th July 2009, we wish to object to the Local Government (Auckland Council) Bill committee refusing to accept the submission of Better Democracy NZ.

You mention in your letter that our submission does not address the matters raised in the bill. Perhaps this is because the bill has overlooked the most important aspect of a democracy, that being the right of voters to call a referendum when they think it is appropriate. Not to consider our submission is the height of arrogance and appalling.

As the employees of New Zealanders, we demand our submission be considered by the committee. We feel totally insulted and expect an apology for returning our submission.

Steve Baron
Better Democracy NZ

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Do we have a cartoonist?

We are looking for someone who would create a cartoon character called "Jonkey" - pictured as a stubborn donkey, who represents all the MPs over the last 13 years who, when presented with an overwhelming referendum result say they can't do anything about it because the the Referendum question was "badly worded". If you can oblige email steve@betterdemocracy.co.nz

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Medical marijuana

The medical marijuana conscience vote in parliament raises an important question like all the conscience votes before it. Why is the conscience of a member of parliament more important than my conscience?

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DIRECT DEMOCRACY: New Approaches to Old Questions

Professors Arthur Lupia and John G. Matsusaka from the Center for Political Studies put forward an essay to answer old questions by opponents of binding referendums

 Are voters competent?
 What role does money play?
 How does direct democracy affect policy?
 Does direct democracy benefit the many or the few?

KeyWords initiative, referendums, voting, elections, law making

Abstract: Until recently, direct democracy scholarship was primarily descriptive
or normative. Much of it sought to highlight the processes’ shortcomings.We describe
new research that examines direct democracy from a more scientific perspective. We
organize the discussion around four “old” questions that have long been at the heart
of the direct democracy debate: Are voters competent? What role does money play?
How does direct democracy affect policy? Does direct democracy benefit the many
or the few? We find that recent breakthroughs in theory and empirical analysis paint
a comparatively positive picture of the initiative and referendum. For example, voters are more competent, and the relationship between money and power in direct
democracy is less nefarious, than many observers allege. More new studies show that
the mere presence of direct democracy induces sitting legislatures to govern more
effectively.

INTRODUCTION

For better or worse, the institutions of direct democracy—initiative and referendum—
have become an integral part of American democracy. At present, more than half of the states and cities in the United States provide for the initiative and
referendum, and more than 70% of the population lives in a state or city where
direct democracy is available (Matsusaka 2004). These institutions have been a
part of American government for more than 100 years now, making them older
than universal women’s suffrage and direct election of U.S. senators, and there
is reason to believe that they will become increasingly important in the future.
No state with the initiative or referendum has ever chosen to do away with the
procedure, and states without the procedures are gradually adopting them (at a
rate of about one state per decade since the end of World War II).
Direct democracy is flourishing outside the United States as well. In Western
Europe, ten countries allow initiatives (as do six of the post-Soviet states), most
countries use referendums1 from time to time, and the proposed constitution for
the European Union now includes a provision for initiative and referendum. It has
become almost the norm to use referendums to make important public decisions; 29
elections have been held on European integration alone (see, e.g., Hug & Sciarini
2000, Hug 2002).

Despite its rise, however, direct democracy remains controversial. Most citizens
like it—American and European surveys consistently reveal strong support for direct
democracy. Many journalists and political elites, on the other hand, are deeply
skeptical. Their main points of contention are almost proverbial: Are voters competent to make policy decisions? Is money too important in initiative campaigns?
Does direct democracy allow special interests to subvert the policy process, or
does it empower citizens to counteract special interest influence in the legislature?
These questions were at the heart of the debate over direct democracy during
the Progressive movement a century ago, and they remain the central questions
today.

Scholars also address these questions. In fact, they have written hundreds of
books and thousands of articles about direct democracy. Until recently, however,
this literaturewas almost entirely descriptive or normative. Fewscholars treated the
questions as scientific propositions that could be evaluated theoretically and tested
empirically. The historical obstacles to examining direct democracy scientifically
have been the lack of formal language to filter competing arguments by their
logical consistency and a high cost of computing that impeded all but the simplest
empirical inquiries. In recent decades, these obstacles have eroded. The increasing
sophistication of econometrics and the advent of low-cost computing make it
possible to work with large data sets, isolate key effects, and establish robust
empirical relations. At the same time, the development of powerful new theoretical
tools, including formal modeling, allows more sophisticated examinations of direct
democracy’s strategic, informational, and policy-related aspects.

In this essay,we discuss the research engendered by the fortuitous confluence of
breakthroughs in theory and empirical analysis. After a brief review of definitions
and concepts in the next section, we focus on four “old” questions that have long
been at the heart of the direct democracy debate:
 Are voters competent?
 What role does money play?
 How does direct democracy affect policy?
 Does direct democracy benefit the many or the few?

We address each question in two ways. First, we highlight the methodological
foundations of the new studies in order to distinguish their approach from the
largely descriptive and normative literature that preceded them. Second, we discuss
the new literature’s substantive findings.

1We use “referendums” rather than “referenda” as the plural following the Oxford English Dictionary and the convention of the literature.

NEW APPROACHES TO DIRECT DEMOCRACY

Although it is too early to draw definitive conclusions about all aspects of direct
democracy, the new approaches challenge many old answers. The new insights
paint a relatively positive picture of the initiative and referendum. They show
that voters are more competent than many critics allege and that the relationship
between money and power in direct democracy is far less nefarious than many
“prescientific” authors contend. In other words, the new approaches’ results are
more in line with the preponderance of public opinion than they are with the
negative valence of many previous writings.

DEFINITIONS AND CHALLENGES

Our focus here is on new approaches to old questions about direct democracy,
so we do not dwell on legal and institutional details except where they are important
to answering the questions. However, it is useful to define a few terms
and provide a little institutional context before proceeding. Direct democracy is
a broad term that encompasses a variety of decision processes, including town
meetings, recall elections, initiatives, and various forms of referendums. This essay
focuses on the two most important and widely used processes, the initiative and
referendum.

The referendum is a process that allows citizens to approve or reject laws or
constitutional amendments proposed by the government. Referendums come in
several flavors. Petition referendums allow citizens to challenge laws approved by
the legislature. Legislative referendums are measures referred to the voters by the
legislature for their approval. Some legislative referendums are mandatory. Fortynine
states, for example, require that voters approve constitutional amendments.
Other legislative referendums are less binding. At the extreme are advisory referendums.

Governments use these referendums to gauge public opinion, but the
outcomes of such elections have no direct implications for law or policy.
The initiative is a process that allows ordinary citizens to propose new laws
or constitutional amendments by petition. The main difference between initiatives
and referendums, therefore, is that citizens can write the former whereas only
government officials can draft the latter. Some of the most famous recent uses
of direct democracy, such as California’s Proposition 13 of 1978, were citizensponsored initiatives that became law despite broad opposition in sitting legislatures.

Figure 1 indicates which states currently provide for the initiative and
referendum.

The single most comprehensive source on the law and use of the initiative and referendum in America is the Initiative and Referendum Almanac (Waters 2003). Information on direct democracy in the states also can be found in Magleby (1984), Dubois & Feeney (1998), Matsusaka (2004), and theWeb site of the Initiative & Referendum Institute (http://www.iandrinstitute.org). Information on direct democracy in cities can be found in Schmidt (1989) and Matsusaka (2003). European information is reported on the Web site of the Initiative & Referendum Institute Europe (http://www.iri-europe.org).

Figure 1 States with the initiative or referendum, 2003.
The most obvious difference between direct democracy and more traditional
legislative processes is the direct participation of voters. However, scholars have increasingly turned their attention toward other procedural differences whose consequences are potentially important.We focus on three such differences: qualification requirements, the need to run an electoral campaign to pass a law, and the unique challenges of asking legislators and governmental actors to implement laws that they did not create. Before proceeding, we describe each of these factors
briefly.

Qualification
To put a policy proposal on the ballot, its advocates are required to demonstrate
that it elicits at least a minimal degree of public interest. Signature requirements
are the most common means for sponsors of initiatives and petition referendums to
demonstrate such interest. If a predetermined number of signatures are collected,
the proposal goes before the voters. The required number of signatures varies
from place to place. In the United States the requirement ranges from a low of
2% of registered voters in North Dakota to a high of 15% of votes cast in the
previous general election in Wyoming. In addition to mandating numbers, some
states require signatures to be collected from multiple regions of the state—to
avoid sponsors soliciting signatures in only a handful of densely populated areas.
Massachusetts, for example, allows no more than 25% of signatures to come from
the Boston area. Another important variable is the time allowed for signature
collection. In California, sponsors must collect all of their signatures within a 150- day window. In Florida, sponsors can take up to four years. As we show below,
qualification requirements are important in the new science of direct democracy
because they affect what kinds of policy proposals get on the ballot and the role
of money in determining ballot access.

NEW APPROACHES TO DIRECT DEMOCRACY
Campaigning For many groups using direct democracy, the need to wage an electoral campaign in support of a policy proposal represents an even greater challenge than qualification.

Numerous factors affect the cost of an initiative campaign. In many cases,
reaching large segments of the population requires sizable purchases of advertisement
time on television and radio. Many campaigns also engage heavily in direct
mail. Other factors that affect the cost of waging a successful direct democracy
campaign include the extent of underlying public support (i.e., whether the campaign
seeks to mobilize existing support or change people’s opinions; the latter
is often more expensive) and the resources of the opposition (i.e., whether the
campaign is competitive). When advocates run expensive campaigns, then those
without resources may be increasingly disadvantaged.

Implementation
If an initiative or referendum wins on Election Day, its impact on policy depends on
howit is implemented. In some cases, implementation is easy (e.g., term-limits legislation often provides simple rules, such as a maximum of three two-year terms).
In most cases, however, new laws require more complex interpretation and more
complicated actions. Some initiatives, for example, offer vague implementation
directions and mandate mild or no sanctions on those who choose not to follow existing directions. Policies passed by direct democracy are not always implemented
as written and do not always affect policy in ways that their supporters anticipate
(Gerber et al. 2001). Therefore, understanding when initiatives and referendums
are most likely to be implemented as they were written is an important part of
understanding direct democracy’s ultimate policy impact.

With basic definitions and concepts in hand,wenowturn to the task of describing
what newapproaches to the study of direct democracy imply about its old questions.
We start with an important question about voters.

ARE VOTERS COMPETENT?

Questions about voter competence are acommonfacet of direct democracy debates.
Many people believe that ordinary citizens are incompetent because they base their
political choices on limited factual foundations. Supporting this point of view are
answers to what pollsters call “political information” questions (e.g., “Who is
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court?”). Citizens routinely provide incorrect
answers to such questions on national surveys (Delli Carpini & Keeter 1996).
With such evidence abundant and widely publicized, it is difficult to imagine
that voters are competent to make the kinds of policy decisions with which direct
democracy confronts them. Yet, a frequent finding in new studies of direct democracy
is that they do. To say that citizens are more competent than many critics
allege is not to say that instances of voter incompetence are trivial or nonexistent.

However, techniques such as game theoretic communication models, laboratory
experiments, and specially designed surveys nowallowscholars to more accurately
distinguish malignant informational contexts from benign ones.

The key insight on which this literature builds is that people base most of their
choices, even complex and important ones, on very simple kinds of information.
Making choices in thisway leaves us vulnerable to mistakes, butwe proceed in this
fashion because we have no other option. Each of us has thousands of choices to
make every day.We cannot know detailed information about, or conduct rigorous
research on, the consequences of every choice we face. Because we cannot know
everything, our choices are—as a matter of necessity—based on the few rules of
thumb or heuristics that we adopt.

In one of the first direct empirical examinations of this phenomenon, Lupia
(1994) demonstrated that voters can use simple pieces of information as substitutes
for the detailed information that political surveys show them to lack. His findings
are the result of an exit poll whose purpose was to determine whether relatively
uninformed voters could use information shortcuts—specifically the identity of
groups who supported or opposed the measures in question—to cast the same
votes they would have cast if able to recite the ballot measures’ details. The exit
poll surveyed California voters who were confronted by five complex propositions
regarding the regulation of the insurance industry. Three of the propositions had
been placed on the ballot by the insurance industry, the other two by trial lawyers
and consumer activists, respectively. Pollsters asked respondents how they voted
on the propositions, some socioeconomic and insurance rate–related questions, and
a series of questions about the propositions. These latter questions were intended
to learn not only what respondents knew about the details of the insurance-reform
debate but also to gauge respondent beliefs about the preferences of persons or
groups who took public stands on the initiatives.

The data showed respondents sorting themselves into three categories. The first
category contained voters who knew neither the answers to the detailed questions
about the propositions nor the insurance industry’s preferences. The second category
contained “model citizens”—voters who consistently gave correct answers to detailed questions about the initiatives and who knew the insurance industry’s preferences. The third category contained respondents who could not answer questions
about the propositions’ details but, like the model citizens, knewthe insurance
industry’s preferences.

The study’s central finding is that voters in the second and third categories voted
in very similar ways, whereas voters in the first category voted quite differently.
Voters in the third category voted as if they were model citizens. Such evidence
supports the claim that voters with apparently low levels of political information
can use information shortcuts to emulate the voting behavior they would have
exhibited if they were as informed as the best-informed persons in the survey.
In a more expansive empirical analysis, spanning many states and elections,
Bowler & Donovan (1998, p. 168) reveal that although voters are not “fully
informed” about the details of most of the initiatives and referendums on which
they vote, many of these voters “appear able to figure out what they are for and
against in ways that make sense in terms of their underlying values and interests.
Failing that, others appear to use a strategy of voting no when information is lacking or when worries about general state conditions are greatest. Just as legislators do, these voters make choices purposefully, using available information.”
No scholar working in this area regards information shortcuts, such as interest
group endorsements, as a panacea for the potential problems that limited information
can cause for direct democracy. Results such as those offered above, however,
suggest that voters are more competent than commonly portrayed. The lingering
question is “When are such voters competent?”

New theoretical research (e.g., Lupia&McCubbins 1998) examines conditions
under which voters who use information shortcuts cast the same votes they would
have cast if they were better informed. These models draw from social psychological
research on persuasion (e.g., Eagly & Chaiken 1993, Petty & Cacioppo 1986)
and economic models of strategic communication (see, e.g., Farrell & Gibbons
1989, Farrell & Rabin 1996, Milgrom & Roberts 1986). This kind of research
begins with the premise that a voter may lack the information she needs to vote
competently. Although relying on others for information often requires less of the
voter’s time and effort than does conducting her own investigation of the issues at
hand, such dependence can also entail substantial peril. Not all people from whom
voters can seek advice are trustworthy or knowledgeable.
Theoretical models built from such premises (Lupia & McCubbins 1998,
Ch. 3–5) and associated laboratory experiments (Lupia & McCubbins 1998, Ch.
6–8) show that voters need not know many details of a ballot measure in order to
vote as if they did. If voters have access to reliable advisers, then they can vote
competently despite not knowing many details about the choice at hand. Indeed,
voters have an incentive to seek advice from people who are credible and to avoid
information providers who provide vague or misleading reports. But how do they
do this? Theory shows that political institutions can do some of the work for them.
If these institutions generate the forces that clarify others’ incentives in the eyes of voters (e.g., truth-in-advertising laws, perjury penalties, or incentives to be known as trustworthy, each of which can minimize the range of false statements made about a particular initiative), then voters can do a much better job of choosing good advisers. Therefore, voters can be competent while lacking information about those who provide them with information. Seen in this light, the requirements for voter competence in direct democracy can be quite minimal.

As Lupia & Johnston (2001) argue, it may also be true that polities encounter
issues for which experts are themselves not well informed. In this case, there are
two possible scenarios. In the first scenario, no one in the polity is sufficiently
well informed. In such a case, letting the voters choose policy by direct democracy
rather than leaving it to the legislature causes no loss in competence. In the second
scenario, some elites are knowledgeable, but the electorate’s experts are not. This
scenario can occur in a closed society, where the channels of communication are
centrally controlled, or in a society where effective channels of communication
do not exist. In such a situation, letting voters make policy by direct democracy
can do considerable damage. European and North American states, however, are
not closed societies. Each has access to modern forms of communication and
competitive political environments. Therefore, if someone in a direct democracy
debate has the opportunity to expose the opposing side’s weaknesses, the competitive
nature of politics provides a strong incentive to do so publicly. In such
cases, it is possible, but unlikely, that competing elites will conspire to withhold
important information from potential supporters in the electorate. In sum, if
there are people who are willing to inform voters and if voters can use environmental
factors such as institutions to better understand the motives of the people
they listen to, then voters can cast the same votes they would have cast if more
informed.

Research specifically devoted to questions of voter competence in direct democracy
is a relatively newphenomenon, but much of the theory and evidence produced
by political scientists so far reveal that common stereotypes about voter incompetence rely on shaky theoretical and empirical foundations.

WHAT ROLE DOES MONEY PLAY?

Contemporary discussions of American democracy are preoccupied with the role
of money. When it comes to elected representatives, the main concern is that
campaign contributions lead to corruption and cause officials to adopt policies
favored by contributors but contrary to the public interest. Corruption is a less
significant concern with the initiative and referendum because voters only approve
or reject a specific law; they do not place an official in a position to dispense
favors to contributors. So when it comes to direct democracy, the concern is that
wealthy interests “buy” legislation directly by placing measures on the ballot
and campaigning for their approval. However, many new studies suggest that
whatever the capacity of money to influence ballot proposition elections, it does
not give narrow special interests any greater advantage than they already enjoy in
the legislature, at least with regard to fiscal policy or the social policies that have been studied.

There have been numerous attempts to measure the effect of money on ballot
proposition elections. The earliest studies (e.g., Lowenstein 1982; Magleby 1984,
Ch. 8; Owens&Wade 1986) compared passage rates for small samples of initiatives
in which one side heavily outspent the other to passage rates where spending was
about equal. The general findingwas that heavy spending against a measure tended
to lead to the measure’s defeat, whereas heavy spending in favor of a measure had
a minimal effect.

That basic finding has held up well in studies using more sophisticated techniques
(Garrett&Gerber 2001). For example, Gerber (1999) estimated regressions
for a sample of 125 propositions in eight states to measure the effect of spending
for and against a measure on the measure’s success, controlling for the type
of spending and other variables. She found that spending against a measure had
a large and statistically significant negative effect on the probability of passage,
whereas spending in favor had a small and insignificant effect.

Gerber’s empirical analysis is motivated by a model of interest-group behavior
based on optimization principles from economic theory. She observes that different
groups have different resources available to influence policy (e.g., citizen
groups may have access to more volunteer labor, whereas business groups have
more cash), and their efforts have different productivities (e.g., business groups
may find it difficult to persuade voters if their motives are more suspect than those
of certain citizen groups). As a result, campaign spending by some groups is likely
to be more effective than spending by other groups. Consistent with this idea,
Gerber finds that spending by business groups is particularly ineffective in gaining
approval for measures but is particularly potent in defeating measures. In contrast,
spending by citizen groups appears more effective in passing measures (Gerber
defines citizen groups to include unions and other noncorporate public interest
groups).

Such studies imply a role for money in direct democracy that cuts against
popular stereotypes. Consider, for example, the implications of the role that money
plays in groups’ abilities to satisfy states’ signature requirements. A fact beyond
dispute is that qualifying a measure for the ballot can be expensive. Using paid
signature gatherers to qualify an initiative in California, for example, now costs
well over $1 million. Professional signature collectors have always been a part
of the initiative process (Magleby 1984, Ch. 4), but they are becoming nearly
indispensable in many states. A popular stereotype is that the growing role of paid
signature gatherers allows wealthy interests greater advantages in buying policy.
Gerber’s research shows that the stereotype is not quite right. Business groups
regularly fail to pass the initiatives they sponsor. However, Gerber also finds that
the ability to get on the ballot helps them in other ways. It can trigger a legislative response to stave off the initiative, and even if the measure fails, it may attract enough votes to signal the existence of a large constituency that might prompt the legislature to take some action on the issue—though these outcomes are likely only if the policy in question has substantial public support. Indeed, a survey of business groups reported by Gerber (1999) reveals that their primary reason for promoting initiatives is to send a signal to the legislature, not to achieve passage of the measure.

New studies of voter decision making in direct democracy also reinforce
Lowenstein’s (1982) and Magleby’s (1984) early results. As noted above, Bowler
&Donovan (1998) showthat when voters are uncertain about the likely policy consequences of a ballot proposition, they tend to vote against it. Voters prefer to stick with policies whose consequences they have experienced, namely the policies that continue when initiatives lose, rather than risk voting for a new initiative whose consequences might be very bad. Thus, spending vast sums of money to defeat
an initiative may make voters sufficiently confused and uncertain that they vote
against it. Convincing voters that an initiative represents an improvement over the
known status quo, by contrast, requires more than money. As Lupia (1994), Gerber
(1999), and Lupia & Johnston (2001) show, it also requires the endorsements of
well-known public figures and evidence of broad grass-roots support.

There are two upshots of these considerations. First, the deep pockets of business
groups do not allow them to “buy” favorable policy, but they do provide leverage
in fighting off measures the groups oppose. Second, citizen groups do appear to
be able to use their wealth to gain approval for measures. Thus, it seems that
money matters, but in a nuanced way. The spending evidence also suggests why
the initiative process does not lead to policies contrary to the wishes of the majority (see below):Without preexisting public support, the financial resources of business groups are ineffective in changing the status quo, and the financial resources of most citizen groups are too scarce to bring about much change.

HOW DOES DIRECT DEMOCRACY AFFECT POLICY?

Policies and Performance

The most important question that might be asked about direct democracy is whether
it affects public policy—and, if so, how? If direct democracy does not affect policy
outcomes, then questions about factors such as voter competence and the power
of money lose much of their relevance. A tricky issue in answering this crucial
question is how to measure the effect of an initiative or referendum on policy.
The earlier descriptive and normative literatures approached the issue by studying
the content of measures that were actually approved by the voters and making a
judgment call on their importance. Such an approach relies on several assumptions
that are not generally valid, among them that (a) direct democracy affects policy
only through the passage of measures, (b) policies brought about by the initiative
would not have come about otherwise, and (c) measures approved by the voters
are actually implemented.

Game theory has been instrumental in clarifying how to measure the impact
of direct democracy on policy. The key insight is that the institutions of direct
democracy can affect policy even if they are never used. Intuitively, the threat of an initiative by an interest group may be enough to induce a change in behavior of the legislature. The legislature, for example, may partially accommodate an interest
group to stave off an initiative it considers to be even worse. If the legislature
responds to a threat by altering its policy choice, then the initiative has changed
the policy outcome even though a measure never appeared on the ballot. The
most transparent development of this idea is that of Gerber (1996), who builds on
the agenda-setter model pioneered by Romer & Rosenthal (1979). Gerber (1998)
shows that the possibility is more than theoretical by discussing real cases in which
the threat of an initiative did engender a legislative response. In short, the initiative has both a direct effect (measures approved by the voters) and an indirect effect (changes in legislative behavior), so its effect on policy cannot be measured by examining only the propositions that actually pass.

Theory implies that the mere availability of direct democracy can affect policy.
Agrowing body of empiricalwork tests this claim directly. Some scholars use panel
data for American states and cities and Swiss cantons and local governments. They
then compare policy outcomes in states with and without the initiative process. A
common approach is to regress a policy variable on a set of control variables and a
dummy variable that equals 1 for states with the initiative process. If policy differences remain after controlling for other known determinants of policy outcomes,
such as demographics and political variables, the differences are ascribed to the
availability of the initiative process.

Such studies generally find that the initiative and referendum matter across a
wide range of policies. Matsusaka (1995, 2000, 2004) and Matsusaka & McCarty
(2001) find differences in tax and spending policies in American states and cities.
Feld & Matsusaka (2004) and Schaltegger & Feld (2001) find differences in tax
and spending policies among Swiss cantons and municipalities. Gerber (1996,
1999) finds differences in parental abortion notification and capital punishment
policies, and Gerber & Hug (2002) find differences in minority rights policies
across American states. Moreover, and again consistent with the theory described
above, the studies generally find that the policy impact of initiative and referendum
processes in states diminishes as the cost of using the devices rises (e.g., as the
signature requirement increases).

Beyond observing that direct democracy matters, it is interesting to know how
it matters. For example, does it tend to bring about conservative or liberal policies?

When the initiative was first proposed by the Progressives early in the twentieth
century, it was opposed by conservatives on the grounds that it would become the
tool of socialists and other left-leaning groups: “If socialism is ever established in the United States—so far as it can be established—it will be through the initiative and referendum” (Boyle 1912, p. 29). More recently, the initiative has been associated with conservative causes, especially tax limitation. The older descriptive literature searched for ideological tendencies in direct legislation by subjectively classifying measures and then counting up the number of conservative and liberal measures that passed. The results were generally ambiguous (Cronin 1989). As discussed above, the counting-up approach is not generally valid because it ignores the indirect effects of initiatives and referendums. It also assumes that the measures are faithfully implemented—an assumption to which we return below.

The new research, which is based on theoretically justified estimates of the
full effects (direct plus indirect), provides a fairly clear picture of the ideological tendency of the initiative and referendum. For fiscal policies over the past several decades, the evidence points almost uniformly to a conservative effect of the initiative (see Matsusaka 2004 for evidence and a review of the literature). Initiative states taxed and spent about 4% less than noninitiative states (all else equal), adopted less redistributive financing schemes (relying more on user charges and fees and less on broad-based taxes), and decentralized expenditure from state to
local governments. Similarly, evidence from Swiss cantons shows that the initiative
and referendum reduce spending (Feld & Matsusaka 2004, Schaltegger & Feld 2001). For social policies, Gerber (1999) finds that initiative states are more
likely to require parental notification when minors seek abortions and are more
likely to use capital punishment. It is easy to find examples of particular initiatives that promote liberal causes, such as funding for mass transit, but the statistical evidence shows that these are isolated cases that run against a more general trend:

Over the past four decades, the initiative has tended to bring about more fiscally
and socially conservative policies at the state level than would occur otherwise.
The reverse was true earlier in the twentieth century. Matsusaka (2000) documents
that the initiative increased state spending during the period 1902–1942,
particularly spending on public education and welfare programs. The initiative also
appears to have driven up spending in cities over the past few decades (Matsusaka
2004). Thus, itwould be wrong to conclude that direct democracy is inherently conservative.

Rather than thinking of direct democracy as ideologically predisposed
in a particular direction, it is better to think of it as a “median-reverting” institution that pushes policy back toward the center of public opinion when legislatures move too far to the right or left.

Amore common question is whether the initiative and referendum lead to better
or worse policy decisions. Although many people offer opinions on this matter,
their conclusions usually tell us more about their own policy preferences than about
the desirability of the resulting policies as seen from broader or different normative perspectives. Of course, it is difficult to come up with an objective definition of a good or bad policy, and the new research, with its positive focus, has tended to shy away from normative assessments of the institutions of direct democracy. Yet some interesting steps in this direction have been taken.
One criticism of direct democracy is that voters are myopic: They will approve
new spending programs while at the same time cutting their taxes. The evidence
generally rejects the notion that voters do not understand that budgets must balance
over time. Although initiatives tend to bring about both lower taxes and
lower spending, neither initiatives nor referendums have a significant effect on the
amount of debt issued (Matsusaka 1995, 2004; Kiewiet & Szakaly 1996). At least
in this respect, the initiative process does not lead to prima facie irrational public policies—particularly when you compare such results to the deficit spending
patterns of many professional legislatures.

A scattering of studies has attempted to measure the quality of public decisions
using economic indicia. These studies face the familiar problems associated with
nonexperimental data, and the techniques to resolve those problems are still being
developed, so the findings should be viewed as preliminary. An early study by
Pommerehne (1983) found that municipal services such as trash collection are
more efficient (output for a given level of expenditure) in cities with direct democracy than in cities without direct democracy. Feld & Savioz (1997) estimate an
aggregate production function for the economies of Swiss cantons and find that
those with direct democracy enjoy a higher total output for a given level of labor
and capital inputs than those without. One explanation could be that direct
democracy cantons are using their public funds more productively than cantons
without direct democracy. Blomberg et al. (2001) also adopt a macroeconomic
approach and find that American states with the initiative experience faster growth
in output per capita than those without. They also suggest that public spending
is less wasteful in states with the initiative than in those without. Frey & Stutzer
(2000) approach a similar question in a different way. They study survey data in
which people indicate their “happiness” (subjective well being) and find happier
people in cantons with more direct democracy, after controlling for income and
other demographics.

Other potential benefits of direct democracy have been highlighted recently.
Mendelsohn&Cutler (2000), in a study of a Canadian referendum, find that voters
pay more attention to the media and learn more as campaigns progress, even among
the most poorly informed segments of the electorate. Tolbert and her coauthors
(2003, p. 23) use 1996, 1998, and 2000 American National Election Studies to show
that “exposure to ballot initiatives increases the probability of voting, stimulates
campaign contributions to interest groups, and enhances political knowledge.”
Again, each of these studies should be viewed with some caution because they use
data from specific contexts, but they do lay down a few tracks toward measuring
the quality of public policies under direct democracy. It seems worth noting that
every such study to date points to higher-quality (or no worse) decisions when the
institutions of direct democracy are available.

The Implementation Problem

The literature documenting that direct democracy changes policy is complemented
by another strand of research that investigates the channels though which the policy
changes occur. New research integrates delegation models, econometric analyses,
and case studies to clarify what happens in direct democracy’s implementation
stage. It shows that implementation is a particularly thorny issue for initiatives.
The focal empirical result is that great variation exists in how legislators, bureaucrats, and other government employees react to winning initiatives. Some
measures, once passed, take full effect, whereas others are reinterpreted or ignored
(Gerber et al. 2001). These variations occur because the people who create and
support winning initiatives are not authorized to implement and enforce them.
Instead, they must delegate these tasks to legislatures and bureaucrats.
New research (see, e.g., Gerber et al. 2001, Bali 2003, Gerber et al. 2004) addresses
the question, “When will these governmental actors use their delegated powers to weaken the impact of laws they dislike?” It reveals that initiatives face more difficult implementation problems than many policies passed by professional
legislatures. The initiative process is a very expensive way to seek policy change;
it is cost effective only for people who seek policy changes that the government refuses to provide (Gerber 1999). It is not surprising, therefore, that many initiatives propose policy changes that reflect dramatic departures from the status quo (e.g., overhauling a state’s property tax system), that legislators are unwilling to impose on themselves (e.g., term limits and certain types of campaign finance reform), that the major parties dislike (e.g., open primaries), that cut across existing political cleavages (e.g., bilingual education), that offend important legislative constituencies (e.g., tort reform), or that are considered too hot to handle (e.g., immigration policy and gay marriage).

The challenge for supporters of such initiatives, a challenge that many laws
passed by legislative majorities do not face, is that the same governmental actors
who once blocked the policies from proceeding through traditional legislative
channels may be in a position to influence, or even determine, the extent of
their postelection implementation and enforcement. In other words, laws passed
by voters against the wishes of legislative majorities or governors face powerful
postpassage opposition that laws passed by these government entities do not.
Moreover, when a professional legislature passes a law, rarely is its next move to
disband. Although some legislatures pass laws just before a newbatch of legislators
is sworn in, the legislative body itself continues. Therefore, it is in a relatively good position to oversee those charged with implementing its edicts. Organizations that pass initiatives, by contrast, often disband soon after the election. They cease
raising money, they cease recruiting supporters, they shut down their offices—
they cease to exist. Compared with professional legislatures, such entities are in a
relatively bad position to oversee those charged with implementing their edicts.
Agame theoretic model that builds in these postelection features of the initiative
process shows that the policy changes that are most likely to prevail as initiatives
(as opposed to prevailing in a standing legislature) are less likely to be implemented and enforced, all else staying constant (Gerber et al. 2004). This result is important because many public and scholarly observers of the initiative process believe that a victory at the polls implies a direct policy change. The new research turns this common wisdom on its head. Much of what is important to understanding the initiative process’s policy consequences occurs after Election Day.

DOES DIRECT DEMOCRACY BENEFIT THE

MANY OR THE FEW?

The Progressives promoted the initiative and referendum as ways to counteract
special interest influence in state legislatures. One of the most prominent criticisms of these processes, then and now, is that they actually have the reverse affect: They allow wealthy, organized interests to subvert the policy process (e.g., Broder 2000). The evidence in support of the subversion criticism is largely circumstantial.

Special interests are active in qualifying measures for the ballot and in campaigning
for their approval. It is expensive to collect the signatures required to place a
measure on the ballot (more than $1 million in California), making it difficult for
groups without access to significant resources to make proposals.

However, the circumstantial argument rests on assumptions that are not generally
consistent with evolving theory. For one thing, the dominance of the proposal
process by narrow groups does not imply the process works to the disadvantage
of a majority of citizens. In the agenda-setting models of Gerber (1996) and
Matsusaka & McCarty (2001), only policies favored by the majority will be approved
if they come to the ballot. If voters are sufficiently well informed, they will
reject any policies that they find worse than the status quo. In such cases, voters are always better (or noworse) off having an initiative or referendum available, even in the extreme case where proposals are entirely monopolized by special interests. Intuitively, the voters are better off if the interest group offers a proposal that the voters prefer to the status quo provided by the legislature, and they are no worse off if the interest group offers an inferior policy because they will simply reject it. Put differently, a majority of voters can gain when they have the opportunity to choose between two policy options instead of having to accept the decision of the legislature.

The conclusion that the majority is always better off having the initiative and referendum available is a fairly general property of complete information models but
does not necessarily hold with incomplete information. For example, Matsusaka&
McCarty (2001) show that when the legislature is uncertain about the preferences
of the majority of voters, the voters might be worse off having the initiative available because the legislature will cater to special interests in an effort to avoid the risk of an initiative campaign. Similarly, Gerber & Lupia (1995) show that when voters are uncertain about the policy implications of a referendum and are also
unwilling or unable to seek the advice of credible experts, then direct democracy
can produce policy outcomes worse than the status quo. In sum, when voters or
legislators have information sufficient to make simple binary comparisons such as
“better” and “worse,” then direct democracy can be an effective way to improve
policy—and the studies cited in our earlier discussion of voter competence suggest
that voters have sufficient information more often than critics allege.

Another problem with the circumstantial argument is that it neglects the influence
of special interests in the legislature. It is probably fair to say that wealthy,
organized interests are more influential than disorganized interests both in the
legislature and in initiative campaigns. The question, then, is whether special interests are relatively more influential in the legislative or in the initiative process.

It could be, for example, that the direct democracy playing field is tilted in favor
of special interests but less so than the playing field of more traditional legislative processes.

Neither the circumstantial evidence nor theory provides a clear answer as to
whether special interests gain from the initiative process. The only way to find the
answer is by examining the evidence of how direct democracy has functioned in
practice. The most extensive attempt to answer the question is that of Matsusaka
(2004), who studies data spanning the entire twentieth century at both the state
and local level and asks whether the initiative has brought about policies favored
by special interests or by the majority. (A special interest is defined as an interest contrary to the majority’s interest.) The core evidence in Matsusaka’s book concerns fiscal policy of state and local governments over the past several decades.
The research strategy is first to document how the initiative changed fiscal policy
and then to compare those changes with public opinion surveys to see if a majority
of people opposed the changes, as the special interest subversion view implies, or
favored the changes. Over the past three decades, three fiscal effects of the initiative are documented (Ch. 3): (a) The initiative cut spending and taxes, (b) the initiative decentralized spending from state to local governments, and (c) the initiative shifted revenue out of broad-based taxes and into user fees and charges for services.

Matsusaka (Ch. 4) examines a variety of opinion data in which people expressed
their preferences about spending, taxes, the division of spending between state and
local governments, and revenue mix. The opinion evidence consistently shows that
a majority of people favored the changes brought about by the initiative. In no case
was there a majority opposed to the changes. The idea that the initiative allows
special interests to subvert the policy process to the detriment of the public is not
supported by any of the evidence.

Gerber’s (1999) finding on parental abortion notification and death penalty
policies points in the same direction. Although she examines only a single year,
and her analysis does not focus on this point directly, it can be shown that her
estimates imply that policies in initiative states were more likely to be consistent
with majority opinion than policies in noninitiative states (see Matsusaka 2004,
Appendix 4).

Lascher et al. (1996) and Camobreco (1998) also adopt a scientific approach
to the problem. Both studies attempt to compare the responsiveness of policy
to public opinion in initiative and noninitiative states across a number of policy
dimensions. They find little effect. However, their results are generally statistically insignificant, preventing strong inferences from being drawn, and in any case rest on a problematic methodology (Matsusaka 2001).

To summarize, it appears that direct democracy has not led to special interest
subversion when it comes to fiscal policies and certain social policies over the past
several decades. There may be other policy dimensions not yet studied in which
the special interest subversion view is correct. However, the fact that none of the
existing evidence supports that view argues for its rejection until confirmatory
evidence appears.

The picture that emerges is of the initiative as a majoritarian device. As discussed
above, the initiative has pushed policy in a conservative direction over the past several decades. If we put the facts together, the implication is that, over the past several decades, legislatures have tended to deliver policy to the left of majority opinion, and the initiative has provided the majority with a way to correct what they see as the mistakes of their representatives. Matsusaka (2004, Ch. 7) reports additional evidence that supports this view. It turns out that the antitax effect of the initiative was especially strong in the 1970s and 1990s, two periods during which public opinion was drifting in a conservative direction (e.g., Stimson 1999), but the initiative did not affect taxes in the 1980s, a period when public opinion was shifting in a liberal direction. One interpretation is that direct democracy causes policy to react more swiftly to changes in public opinion than does policy making by legislatures.

The view of the initiative as a way to correct nonmajoritarian policies of the legislature can also explain why the initiative drove up spending in the early twentieth century. In the decades surrounding the turn of the nineteenth century, the economy underwent a dramatic shift from a rural to an urban economy. Urban voters
wanted increased government spending on education, roads, sewers, welfare, oldage
pensions, and so on.However, rural interests controlled the legislatures because
district lines tended to overweight the countryside (this was before the one-person
one-vote principle was established). In the face of recalcitrant legislatures, the
initiative allowed the new urban majority to directly approve its new spending
programs.

CONCLUSION

This essay describes a new approach to research on direct democracy that has
emerged in recent years in the wake of breakthroughs in theory and empirical
analysis. We have not attempted to be comprehensive. Indeed, to highlight what
the new science of direct democracy can do, we have also chosen to highlight
findings that are in stark contrast to the largely negative conclusions of writers in
previous decades. Much of the newresearch paints a comparatively positive picture
of the initiative and referendum. For example, voters are more competent and the
relationship between money and power is less nefarious than many observers
allege. Other evidence suggests that the mere presence of direct democracy makes
policy more responsive to public opinion.

The same research also demonstrates, however, that direct democracy is no
panacea. If voters cannot find effective information shortcuts, then direct democracy
may end up producing outcomes that they later regret. Despite substantial
evidence that the mere presence of direct democracy induces more medianoriented
policy outcomes (whether through direct means or the indirect means
identified by scholars such as Gerber and Matsusaka), median outcomes may
not always be a good thing. Indeed, much of the Constitutional apparatus of
American government is intended to prohibit median outcomes when the majority
threatens the rights of the minority. In addition, the historical record reminds
us that the process can also be abused if run in conjunction with intimidation
or manipulation at the ballot box (see, e.g., Lupia & Johnston 2001 for an examination of the litany of abuses associated with referendums in the Napoleonic
era).

To limit such abuses and to increase the likelihood that direct democracy serves
the public well, it is essential to understand howitworks. Scientific approaches can
help. Empirical research can help weed out theories that sound reasonable but are
contradicted by the data, while strengthening theories that survive empirical evaluations.

Theoretical research can help distill seemingly persuasive but logically
inconsistent conclusions from claims that truly follow from concrete observations.
Collectively, such endeavors can help societies more accurately understand
and more effectively adapt to the challenges posed by direct democracy’s “old
questions.”

The Annual Review of Political Science is online at
http://polisci.annualreviews.org
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CONTENTS
NOT YOUR PARENTS’ POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION: INTRODUCTION FOR
A NEW GENERATION, Virginia Sapiro 1
DOWNS AND TWO-PARTY CONVERGENCE, Bernard Grofman 25
“BUSINESS” IS NOT AN INTEREST GROUP: ON THE STUDY OF
COMPANIES IN AMERICAN NATIONAL POLITICS, David M. Hart 47
CITIZENSHIP AND EDUCATION, Eamonn Callan 71
LATINO POLITICS, Rodolfo O. de la Garza 91
GLOBAL MEDIA AND POLITICS: TRANSNATIONAL COMMUNICATION
REGIMES AND CIVIC CULTURES, W. Lance Bennett 125
ACTORS, NORMS, AND IMPACT: RECENT INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION THEORY AND THE INFLUENCE OF THE
AGENT-STRUCTURE DEBATE, Kate O’Neill, J¨org Balsiger,
and Stacy D. VanDeveer 149
STATES AS LABORATORIES: A REPRISE, Sarah M. Morehouse
and Malcolm E. Jewell 177
MEASURING THE EFFECTS OF TELEVISED POLITICAL ADVERTISING
IN THE UNITED STATES, Kenneth Goldstein and Travis N. Ridout 205
OAKESHOTT AND POLITICAL SCIENCE, Kenneth Minogue 227
WHAT DOES POLITICAL ECONOMY TELL US ABOUT ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT—AND VICE VERSA?, Philip Keefer 247
POLITICAL REPRESENTATION IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS,
G. Bingham Powell, Jr. 273
A CRITICAL GUIDE TO BUSH V. GORE SCHOLARSHIP,
Richard L. Hasen 297
PUBLIC DELIBERATION, DISCURSIVE PARTICIPATION, AND CITIZEN
ENGAGEMENT: A REVIEW OF THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE,
Michael X. Delli Carpini, Fay Lomax Cook, and Lawrence R. Jacobs 315
ADVOCACY AND SCHOLARSHIP IN THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL
WAR CRIME TRIBUNALS AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE,
Leslie Vinjamuri and Jack Snyder 345
ix
CONTENTS
MARTIN SHAPIRO AND THE MOVEMENT FROM “OLD” TO “NEW”
INSTITUTIONALIST STUDIES IN PUBLIC LAW SCHOLARSHIP,
Howard Gillman 363
THE CENTRALITY OF RACE IN AMERICAN POLITICS,
Vincent L. Hutchings and Nicholas A. Valentino 383
MODELS OF VETOES AND VETO BARGAINING, Charles Cameron
and Nolan McCarty 409
DEMOCRATIC POLITICS IN LATIN AMERICA: NEW DEBATES
AND RESEARCH FRONTIERS, Gerardo L. Munck 437
DIRECT DEMOCRACY: NEW APPROACHES TO OLD QUESTIONS,
Arthur Lupia and John G. Matsusaka 463
BAYESIAN ANALYSIS FOR POLITICAL RESEARCH, Simon Jackman 483
INDEXES
Subject Index 507
Cumulative Index of Contributing Authors, Volumes 1–7 523
Cumulative Index of Chapter Titles,

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